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We Need More "OdoTime Relglion9 :
A Rese To Jim Rahl
Douglas E. Rosenthal *
Jim Rahl believes in the old-fashioned religion of open global mar-
kets and free international competition, uncontaminated by private or
public restraints. He has pursued this goal brilliantly, aggressively, and
consistently for more than thirty years. While the problem Jim presents
in this issue indicates his frustration that we are still far from achieving
the goal, it is in no small part thanks to him, and the force of his scholar-
ship and advocacy, that some real progress has been made.
In the heady days after World War II, developed nations sought to
create a comprehensive International Trade Organization ("ITO") which
would have included the Havana Charter,' an international treaty like
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") that would have
made restrictive business practices in international markets a violation of
international law. While for much of the forty years since the effort to
draft the Havana Charter the United States has taken a leading, if not
consistent, position in favor of greater global competitiveness, ironically
it was cold feet by the United States that played a decisive part in the
failure to adopt the Havana Charter.
In the wake of this unsuccessful effort to develop an international
competition law, developed states focused their attention on reducing
tariff barriers as an effective means to pursue free trade. This was the
purpose of the GATT, and it has been constructive. Non-tariff re-
straints, however, have prospered. I believe that many countries were
slow to develop national competition law regimes, in part because they
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believed that nurturing domestic industry and protecting it from foreign
competition was more important than realizing the benefits of the market
mechanism. Even in those countries that adopted national antitrust laws
and established government agencies to enforce those laws, limits were
placed on the scope of antitrust enforcement. At the same time, govern-
mentally approved non-tariff barriers, such as import quotas, restrictive
licensing of service sectors, and orderly marketing agreements, were im-
plemented to undercut the antitrust goal of open markets. The old time
religion was shelved in favor of the pragmatic gospel of neo-mercantilism
and the virtues of guided national industrial policies.
I suspect that Jim broadly agrees with me on this diagnosis of how
we lost the old time religion of open global markets. His statement, how-
ever, and much of his past scholarship lead him to favor some different
remedies from those I would propose. First, and perhaps foremost, Jim
believes that the goal could be better pursued if nations took responsibil-
ity for applying their competition law so as to reach their own citizens
engaging in anti-competitive conduct in foreign markets. He and I have
debated this issue,' but neither has persuaded the other.
I think it is largely unnecessary for the United States, for example,
to outlaw a price fixing conspiracy between two U.S. firms that relates
only to their sales of products into another country's market, sales only
injuring consumers in that market. If those sales are into a developed
nation that promotes domestic competition, that nation is likely to have a
competition law and enforcement mechanism that will deal effectively
with such price fixing. This is demonstrated in the recently decided Eu-
ropean Communities Wood Pulp case.3 If those same two firms were to
fix prices in a developed or undeveloped national market that lacked an
effective competition law, the local authorities probably would have little
commitment to free trade. This makes it more dubious for the U.S. anti-
trust law to be applied to anti-competitive practices in the foreign market
over which the other country's authorities have primary jurisdiction.
Furthermore, only a modicum of diligent inquiry is required for officials
in that other country to determine when their national consumers are
paying artifically high prices. Sometimes, high pricing of imported goods
in foreign markets is encouraged to protect domestic industry or reduce
drains on foreign exchange reserves.
2 See Rosenthal, Subject Matter Jurisdiction in U.S. Export Trade, 71 AM. SEC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 214 (1977); Rahl, Applicability of US. Antitrust Laws to Export Commerce, 1985 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 131 (1986).
3 A. Ahlstr6m Osakeyti6 v. Commission, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCII) 14,491 (Sept. 27,
1988).
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In short, private export cartels are a decreasing problem and are a
small economic cost when compared to non-tariff import barriers. Even
if some exports of textiles or steel to the United States reflect certain
private quantity or price restriction agreements, the truly significant ad-
verse impact on U.S. textile and steel consumers comes from the legal-
ized cartelization reflected in the Multi-Fiber Agreement 4 and the Steel
Voluntary Restraint Agreements 5 between nations.
Another point of disagreement between us is Jim's conviction that,
to the extent that governments do promote restrictive policies, private
firms that abide by such policies should not be able to avoid liability
under U.S. and other national antitrust laws. Jim would be tempted to
deny these private firms the protection of exculpatory defenses that im-
munize most governmental acts, private acts compelled by governments,
and private acts that are more clearly subject to the jurisdiction of the
foreign state promoting the anti-competitive policies than they are to the
jurisdiction of the state attacking them (comity).
Unlike Jim, I do not find the U.S. case law over the past several
years particularly hospitable to these defenses,6 and that is regrettable.
Furthermore, largely nullifying them would promote a lawless state of
nature in which the nation that carried the biggest stick could force its
pro-competitive policies on weaker states that have explicitly chosen to
promote non-competitive objectives. That might be appropriate if an in-
ternational antitrust law had been ratified by the nations involved, but I
doubt that such a law will be promoted simply by states pretending it is
already in place.
We also disagree on two smaller points. One is Jim's implicit sug-
gestion that the Restrictive Business Practices Code ("RBP Code")7 of
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
("UNCTAD") could provide the necessary international legal frame-
work for global competitive markets if it were made binding and were
given an enforcement mechanism. Some of the strongest supporters of
the RBP Code were nations with the weakest commitment to competi-
tion in their internal markets. The RBP Code had a political agenda of
4 Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, 25 U.S.T. 1001, T.LA.S. No. 7840
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1974, except for art. 2, paras. 2, 3, and 4, which entered into force Apr. 1,
1974).
5 See, e.g., Arrangement Concerning Trade in Certain Steel Products Between the European
Coal and Steel Community and the United States, 47 Fed. Reg. 49058, app. III (Oct. 24,
1982)(amended and extended on Dec. 11, 1985 and Sept. 5, 1986).
6 See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 722 F.2d 657 (11th Cir. 1983).
7 Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Busi-
ness Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev. 1 (1980).
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promoting the redistribution of resources from have to have not nations,
a special concern of the UNCTAD which has no necessary connection
with promoting global competition and in many respects can be antitheti-
cal to it.
The second suggestion is that consultation and cooperation among
competition officials of member states in the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD") and in bilateral discussions
has not been a meaningful procedure for attacking cartels, primarily be-
cause there is no mechanism for bilateral or multilateral antitrust en-
forcement, even at a level well short of the inclusiveness of nations of the
UNCTAD.
Competition officials are kept on short leashes. That is why their
consultations do not produce more competitive markets. Joint enforce-
ment by two or more national competition agencies is not likely to reflect
the trade policies of one or both of the respective national governments.
To the best of my knowledge, antitrust enforcers and trade policy offi-
cials in every nation see international trade and commerce in very differ-
ent and frequently hostile terms. Antitrust enforcers are often seen as
parochial and impractical by trade officials who consider themselves
pragmatic and non-ideological. This means that with the support of
their political leaders-who, alas, are frequently wary of antitrusters-
trade officials promote the most economically damaging cartel behavior
of all: market allocation agreements involving many agricultural prod-
ucts, heavy industrial products, textiles, and, increasingly, electronic
products.
There is, however, one sentence in Jim's preamble to the question
"What is to be done?" with which I do agree strongly. Cutting out the
middle clause, the sentence to which I refer states, "We should face the
fact that.., governments.. . arrange [internationally applied] restraints
... through our own respective trade practices and policies." This is the
heart of the problem. There is still too much neo-mercantilism and too
little of the old time religion that tells us that more will benefit from true
free trade than will benefit from governmentally restricted trade.
What is to be done? I have three proposals. First, we true believers
should recognize that the conviction that free trade is best must con-
stantly be examined in the light of new economic learning. In a world of
imperfectly free trade, some countervailing restrictions, some tactical
threat of imposing countervailing restrictions, and some circumstances in
which we are just not prepared to pay the full price of free trade in other
lost values may sometimes be justified, not only because that is what the
majority wants, but because sometimes that might be the best possible
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result. We true believers must acknowledge that free trade is an aspira-
tion which, like perfect virtue, will always elude us.
Second, we need to break down the barriers between trade law and
competition law, or at least the application of such laws. We need trade
laws that incorporate competitive concerns, and we need to limit the ap-
plication of competition laws when duly authorized policymakers have
clearly and transparently adopted anti-competitive international trade
policies. State action defenses should not be scaled back; they should be
a safe harbor, provided the authority is clear and the supervision of pri-
vate conduct is close. I consider it a positive development that President
Bush has nominated a distinguished antitrust lawyer, Carla Hills, to be
the U.S. Trade Representative. At least in her, trade and antitrust per-
spectives will intersect.
Third, as a corollary of the second proposal, greater efforts should
be made to involve the GATT in attacking unfair competitive practices.
The GATT negotiators are currently addressing more directly and sub-
stantially than ever before the problem of non-tariff barriers in the inter-
national market for services and agricultural products in the Uruguay
Round. While the bringing of unfair trade practice actions under the
GATT is a neo-mercantilist solution to a neo-mercantilist problem, it
does provide an opportunity to hold governments accountable for the
import restrictive practices they encourage or condone, at least to the
extent the GATT treaty has developed an international competition law
relating to import restrictions.
I am less discouraged than Jim. I see progress. I see progress in the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement,8 in some of the work un-
derway towards a more unified European market by 1992, in significant
deregulation in many nations, not the least Great Britain, and in the
greater degree of acceptance of competition values today-even behind
the Iron Curtain (especially behind the Iron Curtain)-than ever before.
It may be that the old time religion is renewing itself. Keep active in
its ministry, Jim, as you retire from Northwestern Law School. We still
need your proselytizing.
8 See, e.g., Rosenthal, Antitrust Implications of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 485 (1988).
